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LABOR UNIONS: SAVIORS OR SCOURGES?
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN
I. INTRODUCTION: LABOR RETURNS TO THE SPOTLIGHT
I am most honored to have been invited this past April 13, 2012, to
join the distinguished list of Sullivan lecturers at Capital University Law
School. I am also pleased that the law school invited my long-time friend
and basketball buddy, Craig Becker, to comment on my remarks, which, as
we both know, are not entirely to his liking. The new prominence that
labor law receives today stands in sharp contrast to the widespread public
indifference to the subject a generation ago.' A dozen years or so ago, I
attended a meeting of the Labor Law Section of the Association of
American Law Schools, only to hear this common complaint: enrollments
in labor law were dropping, and the course was struggling to survive. That
trend has continued so that today union membership in the private sector
stands at about 6.6% of the workforce, down from about 35% in the
1950s.2 At the same time, the percentage of unionized workers in the
public sector rose for much of this period, but it too is now in decline for
two reasons: first, many of the recent austerity layoffs; and second, in
Wisconsin and Indiana in particular, the rapid decline in union members3
Copyright 0 2013, Richard A. Epstein.
. Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University Law School, the Peter and
Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, the Hoover Institution, and the James Parker Hall
Distinguished Service Professor of Law Emeritus and senior lecturer, the University of
Chicago. My thanks to Jordana Haviv, Ben Margo, and Joshua Stanton, New York
University Law School Class of 2014, for their valuable research assistance.
1 Charles Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the
Current State ofLabor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 1012, 1012 (1984).
2 Steven Greenhouse, Share of the Work Force in a Union Falls to a 97-Year Low,
11.3%, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/business/union-
membership-drops-despite-job-growth.html?_r-0.
3 Douglas Belkin & Kris Maher, Wisconsin Unions See Ranks Drop Ahead of Recall
Vote, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2012, at Al ("Wisconsin membership in the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees-the state's second-largest public
sector union after the National Education Association, which represents teachers-fell to
28,745 in February [2012] from 62,818 in March 2011 .... ). The overall union
membership rate fell from 13.3% to 11.2% between 2011 and 2012. Union Affiliation of
Employed Wage and Salary Workers by State, DEP'T OF LABOR (Jan. 23, 2013),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t05.htm.
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once legislation stripped unions of the right to direct payment of union
dues from workers' paychecks.4 Until recently, unions in the public sector
did not generate much by way of legal controversy because of two key
features of public unions' basic structure.5 First, public unions were
recognized as of right.6 Second, impasses in bargaining were generally
resolved by compulsory arbitration and not by strike (or at least not by
legal strike).7 The real action therefore is in the area of employment
discrimination, with its expanding docket of issues extending to everything
from affirmative action and class actions for disparate impact cases, to
sexual harassment, mandatory retirement, and much more.'
Employment discrimination continues to receive much attention
today,9 but the larger question of the role of unions in both the public and
the private sector has generated massive controversy that has reached the
mainstream press.10 The major struggles in labor law started with the now-
aborted efforts of labor unions to secure passage of the (misnamed)
Employee Free Choice Act," which would have done three things: allowed
union recognition to take place by card check; imposed mandatory
arbitration of initial two-year "contracts" if the parties failed to reach an
agreement within 120 days of union recognition; and stiffened penalties for
alleged unfair labor practices committed by employers during the course of
an organizational campaign.12  The inability to pass that proposed
legislation did not stop the union pressure for an expansion of their rights.
Instead, the campaign switched to the National Labor Relations Board,
whose chairman is by law a presidential appointee and whose other four
4 The dues provision of 2011 Wisconsin Act 10, the so-called Budget Repair Bill, was
later struck down. Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 824 F. Supp. 2d 856, 869-70
(W.D. Wis. 2012).
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT 8
(2009).
6 Id. at 8-9.
7 Id. at 9.
8 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAws 281-82 (1992).
9 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
10 See generally Belkin & Maher, supra note 3; Greenhouse, supra note 2 (both
demonstrating mainstream media coverage).
11 Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, S. 1041, 110th Cong. (2007); Employee Free
Choice Act of 2009, S. 560, 111 th Cong. (2009).
12 EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 4-6.
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members are divided equally between Democrats and Republicans." The
polarization by party was evident during the Bush Administration on a
wide range of substantive and procedural issues.14 Once Barack Obama
was elected President in 2009, the balance of advantage shifted, but the
deep political divisions did not abate.' 5 The Republicans mounted a long
and determined campaign to block the confirmation of Craig Becker, who
received a recess appointment by President Obama in March 2010 over
ferocious Republican objections.' 6  In June, the Supreme Court of the
United States in New Process Steel v. NLRB17 held that the NLRB could
not operate with only two of its five members when the National Labor
Relations Act required a quorum of three members.' Shortly thereafter,
the NLRB general counsel Lafe Solomon initiated a suit against Boeing
claiming that it unlawfully refused to bargain with its various unions when
it announced that it was going to open a new plant in North Charleston,
South Carolina.' 9 The dispute was settled privately before the case reached
the Board, but it generated once again a pitched battle over whether unions
should be able to exert that degree of control over major management
decisions.20
At the same time, the status of public unions has become far more
controversial as well. Generous pensions for workers in public unions in
states like California and Illinois have become the most divisive issue in
21
state politics, with no short-term solution on hand. Most dramatically,
13 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006); Richard Epstein, The Tussle over Craig Becker, FORBES
(Nov. 10, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/09/craig-becker-nlra-nlrb-
john-mccain-nomination-opinions-columnists-richard-a-epstein.html.
14 Epstein, supra note 13.
1s See, e.g., Meredith Shiner, Senate Stops Craig Becker Nomination, POLITICO (Feb. 9,
2010, 5:00 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0210/32758.html.
16 Id.; Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Obama Announces Recess
Appointments to Key Administration Positions (Mar. 27, 2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-announces-recess-
appointments-key-administration-positions.
17 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010).
1 Id. at 2644.
19 See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Case Against Boeing Points to Fights to Come,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2011, at Bl.
20 Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Drops Case Against Boeing After Union Reaches
Accord, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 10, 2011, at B3.
21 Brian Chappatta & Michael B. Marois, Calfornia Beating Illinois Shows Pension-
Gap Cost, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 4, 2012, 12:01 AM),
(continued)
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the issue reached a fever pitch in connection with the systematic efforts of
Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker to limit the collective bargaining rights
of public unions.22 The effort to recall Governor Walker ultimately failed,
resulting in serious negative fallout for union forces, but division of
sentiment in the state has been so strong that people on opposite sides of
the question have been literally unable speak to one another.23
This short summary of the complex events of the last half dozen years
is in large measure a response to two factors. The first is the gradual but
unmistakable overall decline in the standard of living in the United States
and elsewhere.24 Mutual recrimination is a common response in bad times,
as each interest group seeks to cast blame upon the others. The second is
that the labor movement has been unable to maintain its size and influence
under the current set of laws, and has aggressively sought to change the
legal rules of the game.25 What is distinctive about the current initiative is
that it has strong support from President Obama, whose self-conscious
resurrection of the term "progressive" is consciously meant to bring back
echoes of the successful push that organized labor made during the 1930s.
During that period, in rapid succession the labor movement secured the
passage of the Davis-Bacon Act of 193 1,26 the Norris-LaGuardia Act of
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-09-04/califomia-beating-illinois-shows-pension-
gap-cost-muni-credit.
22 Michael Cooper & Katharine Q. Seelye, Wisconsin Leads Way as Workers Fight
State Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2011, at Al.
23 Douglas Belkin, Recall Stirs Passion in a Purple State, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2012, at
A4 ("Tuesday's election on whether to recall Mr. Walker has so bitterly divided this state
that many residents live in parallel societies, limiting themselves to like-minded friends,
separate drinking holes and sympathetic media outlets.").
24 James Browne, Living Standards During the Recession, INST. FOR FISCAL STUDIES
(2009), http://www.ifs.org.uk/bns/bnll7.pdf; Ron Scherer, A Long, Steep Drop for
Americans' Standard of Living, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 19. 2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/201 1/1019/A-long-steep-drop-for-Americans-
standard-of-living.
25 See, e.g., Dale Belman & Paula B. Voos, Union Wages and Union Decline: Evidence
from the Construction Industry, 60 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 67 (2006) (discussing the
decline of American labor union representation over time and using the construction
industry to illustrate the decline). See generally Henry H. Drummonds, Reforming Labor
Law by Reforming Labor Law Preemption Doctrine to Allow the States to Make More
Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. L. REv. 97, 99-103 (2009) (arguing that there is a need to
reform private sector labor relations law and that a "fundamental rebalancing" is needed).
26 Ch. 411, 46 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3148 (2006)).
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1932,27 the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,28 and the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938,29 all of which define the shape of current labor law.
However, in the current setting, they met a determined public and business
opposition, which led to the major union defeat in Wisconsin.
This Article does not stress these short-term controversies, but looks
back to the basic structure of American labor law to explain why the seeds
of the modem breakdown of the institution lay in the basic formation of the
modem legal system. To do so, it is necessary to sketch an alternative
vision of how this field should be organized, after which it is possible to
draw comparisons between the two systems. For these purposes, this
Article works off two benchmarks, which first appear to be sharply
disparate. But, as this Article shows, these benchmarks tend to converge
on a single unified vision that is wholly inconsistent with the current
structure of American labor law. The first is the general social welfarist
account of economics. The second is the common law of labor relations as
it existed in the United States between 1890 and 1914, when it was
subjected to relentless social criticism.
The first approach involves the usual standards of social welfare that
are part and parcel of the general law and economics movement. The
normative standard that this Article sets out is not regarded as particularly
controversial in wide areas of legal work, for it involves the well-known
first theorem of law and economics: "If every relevant good is traded in a
market at publicly known prices . .. and if households and firms act
perfectly competitively (i.e., as price takers), then the market outcome is
Pareto optimal."30  To unpack this basic proposition, when persons are
price takers, there is no room for them to negotiate the price upward or
downward. In perfectly competitive markets, if a seller tries to raise the
price by a penny, the seller loses all business to firms that retain the
competitive price. If the seller tries to take advantage of the situation by
lowering the price by a penny, then the seller can no longer make a profit.32
By pinioning that party to these unpleasant alternatives, transactions take
place with great rapidity because there is no way either side will find it
27 Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 10 1-110, 113-115 (2006)).
28 Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)).
29 Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006)).
30 ANDREW MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONoMIc THEORY 308 (1995).
31 See id. at 315.
32 d.
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beneficial to bargain for a collateral advantage. 3 In practice, this means
that transaction costs tend toward zero as the velocity of transactions tends
to become infinite.3 4 That market is a Pareto optimal market because no
person's position can be improved without worsening someone else's
position."
No market is ideally competitive, of course, but there are many
markets in which the large number of participants (e.g., landlords,
employers, and retailers) on one side of the market, and the even larger
number of tenants, employees, and customers on the other side of the
market create a very respectable first approximation to the competitive
ideal. Under standard assumptions associated with the transaction cost
work of Ronald Coase, the direct path to social improvements lies in
reducing transaction costs in order to help speed this competitive process
along.36
It is important to see the limitations associated with this model because
they lead us back toward the common law rules. Thus, in the words of
Alan Sykes, the definition just quoted requires the following explication:
In other words, in the absence of non-pecuniary
externalities (the complete markets assumption) and with
competitive allocation of resources (no market power), an
unconstrained market equilibrium is economically
efficient.
Nothing in this theorem limits its result to a particular
type of market. Competitive exchange without non-
pecuniary externalities is efficient whether the exchange
involves goods, services, capital or labor. Likewise, any
impediments to competitive exchange will generally create
inefficiency under the assumptions of the first theorem. In
particular, in the absence of non-pecuniary externalities,
government restrictions on competitive labor markets-
including immigration restrictions-create inefficiencies.37
33 id
34 See generally id. (arguing that if a price-taking assumption is made, market power
does not exist and market participants will have no incentive to depart from market prices).
35 Id. at 313.
36 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
3 Alan 0. Sykes, International Cooperation on Migration: Theory and Practice, 80 U.




As will become evident, this definition maps very well the common
law of labor relations, which has to address just these problems. The
various doctrines of labor law are intended to bring the law into closer
alignment with the conditions for successful welfare.38 These include the
prohibition against the use of force and fraud in labor relations, the
prohibition against the inducement of breach of contract, and any form of
combination that brings labor markets further from a competitive
equilibrium. 39 The great utility of the common law approach is that it
addresses, as general economic theorists do not, the various conditions that
tend to undermine the efficiency of labor markets, which is seen only as an
application-a very important application-of a general theory.40
In offering this double-barreled critique of modem labor law, I do not
expect that it will be widely accepted as a desirable template for modem
labor law reform. Opposing political forces are far too strong for that to
happen, at least in the short run. However, it hardly follows that the
inability to secure major revision of any field renders a principled critique
irrelevant. Equally important is the way in which various principles set the
stage of the discussion of incremental changes in the direction and reach of
any field, including labor law. Small changes in legal doctrine and public
administration can have large effects on the day-to-day operation of the
economy.4 1 It is for those reasons that this comparison is worthy of
undertaking. Part II of this Article takes up the common law approach to
this subject both in Great Britain and in the United States, with special
reference to the interaction of labor and antitrust law. Part III addresses the
structural weaknesses of the National Labor Relations Act as a response to
the problem of monopolization. Part IV offers an overview of the current
prospects of the union movement, both in the public and private sectors.
There is no point in keeping anyone in suspense about my views. They are
surely outside the mainstream of the academy. Further, they defend the
proposition that from the perspective of social welfare, labor unions have
Immigration, 80 U. CH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2013) (noting that as a matter of general
principle, the basic theorem applies in both domestic and international contexts).
3 See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 113-14, 126; Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for
Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1380
(1983) [hereinafter Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations].
3 9 Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations, supra note 38, at 1357-58.
40 See id. at 1359 (discussing that the state, through the common law, is entitled to
regulate conditions such as force or fraud).
41 See, e.g., id. at 1402 (discussing the impact of New Deal legislation on product and
labor markets).
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proved not a savior but a scourge. In some limited fashion, some unions
might have productive uses. However, nothing in the history of labor law
justifies the extraordinary set of legal privileges that they have received
over the past 100 years.
II. A COMMON LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS
One key feature of labor relations law is that in its inception it was not
a separate body of law at all.42 Consistent with the modern economic
tendency toward a general unified theory, the great English and American
cases that dealt with the rise of labor unions during the last part of the
nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century did not put
labor law into some separate box delineated by its own statutory
framework.43 Quite the opposite: the entire deliberation took place as part
of the overall structure of private law, which sought to develop legal
relations without worrying about setting out rules that were tied to the
distinct roles of employer, worker, or union.4 The postulates that
undergirded this system were as follows. The first principle was one of
individual autonomy whereby individuals owned capital or labor and could
dispose of either in whatever fashion they saw fit. 45 Under this legal
regime, individuals decided whether to make or not make any offer and by
the same token to accept or reject any offer that came their way.46 The
simple corollary of that position is that the compensation and conditions
associated with any offer were for the parties to determine, not for any
outside party.47 That position could be subject to limitations in cases of the
aged and infirm, but would apply with equal force to markets in labor,
goods, and capital.48 The ostensible inequality of bargaining power of two
sides was rejected as a ground for intervention, given that no difference in
relative size could force one party to accept an offer that made it worse off
than it was before.4 9  Accordingly, these voluntary contracts between
42 Id. at 1357.
43 See id.
4 Id. at 1364.
45 id
46 Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947, 951-
52 (1984) [hereinafter Epstein, In Defense]. See also Epstein, A Common Law for Labor
Relations, supra note 38, at 1366.
47 Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations, supra note 38, at 1368.
48 Id. at 1359. See also Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law
Rules, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1717, 1748 (1982).
49 Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations, supra note 38, at 1360.
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parties were presumptively enforceable because of the gains from trade
that they generated for all participants.o
The classical principle did not automatically enforce all agreements,
most pointedly any contract that was in restraint of trade." These contracts
covered deals between two or more persons on the same side of any
particular market, whose corporations could limit supply and drive up the
price of goods and services above those that these sellers could command
separately in a competitive market.52 The benchmark of the competitive
market is not idly chosen. In line with modem social welfarist theory, it
represents a state of affairs that exhausts all the potential gains from trade,
and thus maximizes a conception of social welfare that does not accord any
privilege or pride of place to any individual or group. On this view,
collective refusal to deal by individuals on one side of the market would
fall prey to the antitrust laws, whether the conduct was by industry or labor
group.
The final principle sought to protect the voluntary contracts in
competitive markets from improper forms of interference by third parties.54
The nature and kind of this "actionable" interference requires some
specification. Competition, in the form of more attractive terms, is always
a form of "interference" that causes "harm.",5  Yet by the same token,
competitive harm is never actionable, for if it were, then the law would
afford no protection to the competitive solutions that maximize levels of
social welfare. 6 The modem term for this situation calls it a nonpecuniary
externality, which gives no clue as to the relationship that it holds with
respect to the operation of a competitive market. The ancient phrase
damnum absque iniuria captured the same sense in the articulation of these
rules at common law." In both systems, pollution from smokestacks and
higher prices from cartelization have real welfare losses so they are not just
so See Epstein, In Defense, supra note 46, at 967-68.
51 See, e.g., Richard Epstein, On Wal-Mart: Doing Good by Doing Nothing, 39 CONN.
L. REv. 1287, 1297 (2007).
52 Id. at 1298.
" See id. at 1299-1300.
54 See Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations, supra note 38, at 1357.
5 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FREE MARKETS UNDER SIEGE: CARTELS, POLITICS, AND SOCIAL
WELFARE 18 (2008).
56 See id. at 20.
5 EPSTEIN, supra note 55, at 18 (explaining the Latin phrase translates to "harm without
injury").
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pecuniary externalities. The loss to a superior competitor lies emphatically
on the other side of the line.
In working through the implications of this position, the common law
judges routinely held that only "unfair" competition was subject to legal
prohibitions.18 Unfair competition comes in two forms.59 The first is the
threat or use of force to disrupt voluntary relationships. 6 0 This principle
applies not only to the disruption of existing contracts, but also to the threat
or use of force with respect to prospective advantage in the form of
possible contracts that were never consummated. The second is the breach
of contract, which is actionable even if the threat or use of force is nowhere
in the picture.6 1 That principle received its authoritative nineteenth century
58 E.g., Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946, 947 (Minn. 1909). The court explained the
evolution of unfair competition as follows:
For generations there has been a practical agreement upon the
proposition that competition in trade and business is desirable, and this
idea has found expression in the decisions of the courts as well as in
statutes. But it has led to grievous and manifold wrongs to individuals,
and many courts have manifested an earnest desire to protect the
individuals from the evils which result from unrestrained business
competition.
Id.
59 See Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations, supra note 38, at 1357.
60 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 531-32 (1935).
In striking down key provisions of the National Industrial Relations Act, a critical
predecessor of the National Labor Relations Act, the Court stated:
The Act does not define "fair competition." "Unfair competition,"
as known to the common law, is a limited concept. Primarily, and
strictly, it relates to the palming off of one's goods as those of a rival
trader. In recent years, its scope has been extended. It has been held to
apply to misappropriation as well as misrepresentation, to the selling of
another's goods as one's own,-to misappropriation of what equitably
belongs to a competitor. Unfairness in competition has been predicated
of acts which lie outside the ordinary course of business and are tainted
by fraud, or coercion, or conduct otherwise prohibited by law. But it is
evident that in its widest range, "unfair competition," as it has been
understood in the law, does not reach the objectives of the codes which
are authorized by the National Industrial Recovery Act.
Id (internal citations omitted).
61 See Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations, supra note 38, at 1357.
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formulation in Lumley v. Gye,62 where action was taken against the inducer
as well as against the party who succumbed to the inducement. In the
simplest case, it was always lawful to induce people to change firms.6" It
was not lawful for them to do so in breach of contract.s
There are of course delicate refinements that operate in each of these
areas, but they need not be addressed here to outline the central features of
the overall system. The key point to show here is how they mesh together
to articulate a labor policy that maximizes the gain from cooperative
behavior in ways consistent with the welfarist position. The classical
position always accepted the standard autonomy principle in allowing all
individuals the exclusive use of their labor or capital.6 6 It did so without an
examination of the wealth or status of these parties, conferring equal rights
of disposition on both sides. Next, it enforced all labor contracts in
accordance with their terms. In some instances, the contracts of
employment were for a specific term, at which point both parties had some
short-term protection against competition from others-protection for
which they had to pay, either in cash or by reciprocal covenants.68 Next,
the antitrust law came into play against unions to the same degree that it
did against employers. The key case on this last point is Loewe v.
Lawlor,6 9 in which a secondary boycott-a boycott of a party that did
business with the firm that the union hoped to organize-was actionable as
a collective refusal to deal under section 1 of the Sherman Act, which
applied with equal force to firms.70
As to interference with prospective advantage, the earlier cases held
the use of pickets could amount to the use of force even though there were
always questions as to whether the sole (or at least dominant) function of
those pickets was to give information to third parties to induce them not to
deal with the firm, which in the case of ordinary customers did not give
62 (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B.).
63 Id. at 749.
6 Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 567 (1871).
65 id.
6 See generally Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68
HARV. L. REV. 999, 1000-02 (1955).
67 Id.
" Id. at 1001.
69 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
70 Id. at 306-08. The aftermath of this case sustained the collection of monetary
damages from union members who supported the boycott effort. See Lawlor v. Loewe, 235
U.S. 522 (1915).
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rise to the tort of inducement of breach of contract.71 The major case on
point is Vegelahn v. Guntner.'2 There, the union sought to convince
current workers not to enter their place of employment, which counts as
inducement of breach of contract, and to persuade potential employees not
to enter either, which requires some threat or use of force to be
actionable.73 The divided Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found
that certain picketing amounted to intimidation and was thus actionable
under common law principles.74 That decision did not announce, nor could
it defend, a per se rule that necessarily equated picketing with coercion.
The law in this area starts from the premise that the distinction between
coercion and persuasion is fundamental to the preservation of any well-
organized society. Though that line is clear in most cases, it is often blurry
in picketing cases, which can easily contain elements of each. In
Vegelahn, there is much to be said for Holmes's dissent.76 However, just
because two pickets marching before a building might be informational,
squads of pickets brandishing signs may not be.
The obligations on outsiders are greater when they hope to upset not
prospective advantage, but existing contracts. That issue, too, came to the
fore in Vegelahn, when the pickets sought to induce employees not to
report for work, which would be caught by the tort of inducement of
breach of contract, even though their motive was not (as was the case in
Lumley) to hire the workers themselves, but only to get them to side with
the union and perhaps to join their ranks.77 This larger issue surged to the
fore in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell,78 a 1917 Supreme Court
decision that arose out of a strike in the West Virginia coal mines.79 The
mine ran on a "non-union" basis; the workers agreed that they would not
join a union so long as they remained in the employ of Hitchman Coal.s0
The union then persuaded many of these workers to agree to join the
United Mine Workers once the strike was called, but not to quit their
71 See, e.g., Scofes v. Helmar, 187 N.E. 662, 664 (Ind. 1933).
72 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896).
3Id. at 1077.
7 4 Id. at 1078.
7s See, e.g., id.
76 Id. at 1079 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
77 Compare id. at 1077, with Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B.) 752.
78 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
7 Id. at 232-33.
80 Id. at 233.
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employment until that time.8 1 The clear intention of that decision was to
secure unified withdrawal under circumstances in which it would be
difficult for the mine owners to resume production.82
One reason that mines (and railroads) are especially vulnerable to these
collective actions is that their most valuable assets-coal and tracks-are
fixed in place. The mine owners therefore could not move to another
location once union organizers came. Firms in both of these industries,
moreover, enjoy site-specific rents that allow the owner of a key resource
to earn more than a competitive rate of return, even in highly competitive
contexts. Those firms that can extract cheap coal can gain an economic
rent on its sale that could not be captured by those mines whose coal was
deeper in the ground, such that the cost of its production was closer to the
market price. The sale of the mine, moreover, would be at a positive
price to reflect the present discounted value of that income stream. In the
end, that new owner could only obtain a competitive rate of return, taking
into account the cost of acquiring the asset. The fact of sale thus does not
exclude the process of expropriation. 4 That new firm too remains
vulnerable to strikes because it would pay for the firm to remain in
operation even if the union were able to extract wage concessions that
could not be covered from the profits of the firm. The option remains for
that firm to operate at a loss, albeit one smaller than it would suffer if it
just shut down operations altogether. Put otherwise, the sale of the
business for fair market value neither increases nor decreases the risks of
expropriation.
81 Id. at 245-46.
82 Id. at 247.
83 Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS 575, 577 (1982) (noting that
an economic rent equals the difference between the amount that a party receives and the
lowest sum that it would take for the asset, which is normally its cost of production).
84 Note that a close parallel arises in cases of rate regulation where the public utility
makes its investment in a plant before it receives compensation from its rate payers. Hence,
the rate regulation could control monopoly rents, but it could not result in the confiscation
of sunk costs. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603
(1944). The difference in the two cases is this. With rate regulation, the public utility has a
natural monopoly which allows it to charge super competitive rates, which regulation is
needed to combat. But in this case, there is no need for any sort of regulation because the
market in coal is intensely competitive. Competition of site-specific rents does not improve
allocation, but does result in costly rent dissipation.
85 See Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations, supra note 38, at 1385.
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Given this situation, the site-specific rents become the source of
contention unless the company can find a way by agreement to pay wages
that reduce the likelihood that workers will organize to take some fraction
of the surplus." In this instance, any firm effort to achieve that result is
socially desirable because it reduces the amount of rent dissipation that
could take place through bargaining over surplus that could lead to strikes
in the event that two sides could not reach agreement. Understood in this
light, the so-called "yellow dog" contract was a sensible effort of
management to preserve its site-specific rents. It was therefore the case
that the employer could insist on the exclusive loyalty of its worker during
the period of employment. Accordingly, it became a breach of contract
for any worker to join a union while remaining at work under a contract at
will, or even to promise to join a union at the beck and call of the
employer. 89 At this point, one can see the genuine benefit that inures to the
employer from this arrangement, which was not apparent in cases like
Lumley v. Gye, which involved one opera singer, Johanna Wagner, whose
services were sought by two impresarios. 90 Thus, the private injunction
that Lumley was able to secure against Wagner in this instance mattered;
and in fact, she went home singing for neither impresario.91 The practical
difficulties of securing either injunctions or damage remedies against the
individual miners who breached their contract are evident. It is not that
these remedies are worthless, but they are hardly adequate. The remedy
that enjoins the union from approaching these workers is effective because
it directs state force against a single responsible party and not against a
diffuse mass of individuals. In so many areas of law, the key concern
always revolves around transaction costs, and allowing this remedy is thus
critical to enforcing the basic contract.
In response, it could be urged that the injunction should not be allowed
because of its effects on third parties. Effects, there surely are, but they cut
in the opposite direction. It was evident in Hitchman Coal that these
workers desired the yellow dog contract as much as management did: the
level of strike and discord was sufficient to disrupt the relationships to the
86 Id.
87 Id.
8 See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1917).
89 See, e.g., id. at 254-55.
90 Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B.) 752.




workers' detriment. It also prevented Hitchman Coal from fulfilling its
contracts with the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, with further ripple effects
down the line.93 Strikes and job actions always have these negative
consequences on third parties, which are not the result of the operation of
competitive forces, but consequential damages from the initial tort of
inducement of breach of contract or interference with advantageous
relationships-both of which were in play in Hitchman Coal.9 4 If the coal
miners are liable for breaching their contracts, they should surely treat
these damages as recoverable against the union. Allowing the injunction
cuts through that Gordian knot before it becomes tied. It avoids the
valuation problem that is difficult, if not impossible, to solve. As in other
contexts, one reason to grant injunctions is to get rid of the tangle of
damage actions that might be needed if the disruption is allowed to take
place.
In sum, the basic outlines of pre-1937 labor policy had all four
elements needed for the system to work well: strong enforcement of labor
contracts, backed by protection against tortious interference with contracts
and prospective advantage, but limited by the application of the general
antitrust law on both sides. However, this system generated substantial
political resentment. Owing to the various means of mass production, the
system was subject to attack on both sides, which explains why the issue
was surely one of the two or three most contentious political issues from
the late 1890s through the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. It is
therefore necessary now to turn briefly to an outline of the general labor
reforms of the progressive era to show how they deviated systematically
from the requirements of the welfarist position.
III. THE RISE OF MODERN LABOR LAW
A. The British Experience
The reaction to the classical liberal synthesis on labor law took place in
stages. The first major move in this regard took place under the British
Trade Disputes Act of 1906, whose interconnected position exempted
unions from all of the previously mentioned general prohibitions found in
the common law.95 Thus, in short order, the statute completely immunized
92 Hitchman Coal & Coke Co., 245 U.S. at 239.
9 Id. at 237.
94 Id. at 235-36.
9s Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 47 (Eng.) (consolidated in the Trade Union
and Labour Relations Act of 1992).
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unions from tort liability, which was the antithesis of Loewe v. Lawlor.96
Next, the 1906 Act neutralized the law of conspiracy by providing that any
action done by many people together would not be actionable unless it
would be actionable if done by one person acting alone.97 The point is
critical because it meant that the collective refusal to deal-a per se
violation under the antitrust acts-became perfectly legal, thereby
reversing some earlier English precedents that had taken the opposite
position.98 Finally, the statute eliminated in the context of labor disputes
both the torts of inducement of breach of contract and interference with
prospective advantage "with the right of some other person to dispose of
his capital or his labour as he wills."99 This provision overturned the
decision of the House of Lords in South Wales Miners' Federation v.
Glamorgan Coal Co.,too allowing the action for inducement of breach of
contract over the union defense that such was done with the honest
intention to advance the welfare of union members.'o Note that this
rationale deals with the recurrent issue of the problem of double effect in
that the desire to help workers is known by unions necessarily to hurt
management.10 2 That defense would have never been allowed in Lumley.
Indeed, the last quoted phrase in the Trade Disputes Act is intended to
reject the traditional view of the common law baseline with respect to both
labor and capital. 03
Thereafter, the English courts held that labor contracts were not
generally enforceable because the parties did not intend to create legal
relations.10 4  In effect, all the economic weapons that were limited at
common law were removed. In 1964, the English House of Lords decided
Rookes v. Barnard,05 which drove a huge gap in the 1906 Act by granting
Rookes, who had been dismissed by British Overseas Airlines pursuant to
its closed shop agreement with the Association of Engineering and
96 208 U.S. 274, 293-96 (1908).
9 Trade Disputes Act § 1.
9 See, e.g., Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495 (H.L.) 542-43 (appeal taken from N.
Ir.).
99 Trade Disputes Act § 3.
"0o [1905] A.C. 211 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
'o' Id. at 244.
102 See, e.g., id. at 240.
103 Trade Disputes Act § 3.
'0 See Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act, 1992, c. 52, § 179
(Eng.) (the current English statute governing labor disputes).
105 [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
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Shipbuilding Draughtsman, a victory over the union.106  The House of
Lords found the union guilty of intimidation, a tort outside the scope of the
1906 Act.107  That decision, which came down just before I arrived at
Oxford in 1964 for my first year, was vilified by the academic community
at the time and left me astonished, as I had no sense of the size of the
stakes in Rookes.'08 As a matter of first principle, the collective refusal to
deal would have been actionable under the case law prior to the 1906
Act. 09 In retrospect, Rookes surely did amount to an unprincipled end run
around the 1906 Act. At that point, the trade unions' position was stronger
because the unions had a legitimate statutory claim that Rookes upset the
explicit balance between management and labor that the 1906 Act had
forged.o The Trade Disputes Act of 1965 promptly closed that gap."'
The return to legal orthodoxy, however, did nothing to deal with the
fundamental difficulties with the English labor regime. When Margaret
Thatcher became Prime Minister in 1979, matters turned even more
contentious and culminated in the confrontations between the trade unions
and the British government over the operations of the coal mines.'1 2 The
British experience offers no consolation for those who think it is possible
to carve out a sustainable regime for labor disputes that works in
systematic deviation from the common law rules.
106Id. at 1197, 1207, 1209.
'
07 Id. at 1207, 1209.
108 See K.W. Wedderburn, Notes of Cases, Stratford and Son Ltd v. Lindley, 28 MOD.
L. REV. 205, 209 (1965) (referencing, inter alia, Innis Christie, Comments, Rookes v.
Barnard, 42 CAN. B. REV. 464,474 (1964); K.W. Wedderburn, Intimidation and the Right to
Strike, 27 MOD. L. REV. 257, 280-81 (1964); K.W. Wedderbum, The Right to Threaten
Strikes II, 25 MOD. L. REV. 513, 513 (1962); K.W. Wedderburn, The Right to Threaten
Strikes, 24 MOD. L. REV. 572 (1961)).
9 See EPSTEIN, supra note 55, at 68-69; J.J. Posner, English Trade Disputes Act of
1906, 10 CAL. L. REv. 395, 398 (1922).
110 See David R. Lowry et al., Legal Intervention in Industrial Relations in the United
States and Britain-A Comparative Analysis, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1979).
1" Trade Disputes Act, 1965, c. 48 (Eng.). See also Andrew Hodge, The Curious
History of Trade Union Law, 4 DENNING L.J. 92, 106 n.75 (1989); William M. Rees &
Harvey B. Minsky, Labour Relations and the Law: Some Academic Reflections, 6
CAMBRIAN L. REV. 20, 27 (1975).
112 Paul Wilenius, Enemies Within: Thatcher and the Unions, BBC NEWS (Mar. 5, 2004,
1:15 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/politics/3067563.stm (describing Margaret
Thatcher as "the nemesis of the trade union movement").
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B. The American Experience
The historical development of antitrust laws in the United States was
complicated by at least three factors that were absent in Britain." 3 First
was the passage of the Sherman Act.1 4 Second was the complexity of
American federalism, which limited the scope of the antitrust laws to
activities in interstate commerce.115  Third were the constitutional
protections that the United States Constitution allowed to employers to
resist labor inroads, most notably in Adair v. United States"6 and Coppage
v. Kansas,"' which struck down collective bargaining statutes introduced
at the federal and state level, respectively.
One early notable step in the American setting was the Supreme
Court's 1908 decision in Loewe v. Lawlor that applied the Sherman Act to
unions just as progressive political forces were moving sharply in the
opposite direction."' 8 The passage of the Clayton Act of 1914 marked the
initial divergence in the antitrust treatment of corporations and labor
unions.119 On the firm side, section 7 extended the reach of the antitrust
laws to mergers and acquisitions that might "substantially lessen"
competition.120 No longer did public officials in either the Justice
Department, or under the 1914 Act, the Federal Trade Commission, have
"3 See Bernard D. Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust
Laws, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 659 (1965) (giving one account of the early history of American
antitrust laws).
114 See Edward A. Adler, Monopolizing at Common Law and Under Section Two of the
Sherman Act, 31 HARv. L. REV. 246, 250-51 (1917); Epstein, A Common Law for Labor
Relations, supra note 38, at 1380 (referencing Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Collective Bargaining
and Competition: The Application ofAntitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J.
14, 30-32 (1963)); Mark T.L. Sargent, Economics Upside-Down: Low-Price Guarantees as
Mechanisms for Facilitating Tacit Collusion, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2055, 2100 (1993). But
see Felix H. Levy, The Federal Anti-Trust Law and the "Rule of Reason," 1 VA. L. REV.
188, 190 (1913).
115 See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 409-13 (1922)
(dealing with the distinction between "local" strikes and those intended to interfere with
interstate commerce).
116 208 U.S. 161, 179 (1908).
1" 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1914).
... 208 U.S. 274, 276, 280 (1908).
" Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(2006), 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2006)).
120 Id. § 7 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006)).
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to wait until the merger took place.121 Instead, a preclearance procedure let
them block mergers and acquisitions that were thought to violate the new
substantive antitrust norm.122
At the same time, the Clayton Act contracted the scope of the antitrust
laws in connection with both labor and agricultural markets.123  The
operative text, section 6, famously held that "the labor of a human being is
not a commodity or article of commerce." 24 This amendment has a long
and complex history.12 5 Its precise extent was much mooted,12 6 and in
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,127 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that section 6 did not insulate union activity taken in
cooperation with nonunion businesses to unionize a particular facility. 28
The Court in Duplex Printing read the Clayton Act more narrowly than the
dissent,' 29 but it did not deny that section 6 had any operation whatsoever
because it insulated union actions directed against the target firm even if it
left Loewe v. Lawlor untouched insofar as it dealt with secondary
121 id
12 2 id.
123 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 85 (2006).
124 Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006).
That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to
forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having
capital stock or Gonducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual
members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the
legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members
thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
Id. The exemption of labor unions from the antitrust laws was long sought by American
labor unions, and had been explicitly endorsed by the 1908 Democratic National
Convention. Joseph Kovner, The Legislative History of Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 47
COLUM. L. REv. 749, 750-51 (1947).
125 For my take on § 6, see EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 123, at 84-89.
126 See Kovner, supra note 124, at 750-51 (discussing strong support for a broad
reading of the Act).
127 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
1218 Id. at 475-78. See also FELIx FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION, 169-70 (1963) (one of the major influences that helped pass the Act).
129 254 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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boycotts.130  Even this short account shows that the general welfarist
theorem--one that sees the superiority of competition in all business and
labor settings-has been consciously been set aside.
The federal antitrust laws were also pressed into business to deal with
the recurrent question of labor violence directed at firms for clearly
anticompetitive ends. Thus, United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal
Co.,' 3 ' decided in 1922, was the capstone of extensive litigation brought by
an open shop miner whose property was destroyed by the District Union
that had jurisdiction over his area.13 2 Unlike Duplex, no one wanted to
argue that the law protected acts of violence. 133  However, the harder
question was whether these acts were protected solely at the state level by
ordinary tort law or whether these acts were a violation of the antitrust
laws because of their efforts to monopolize the interstate industry. 13 4
Given the relatively narrow scope at the time of federal power under the
Commerce Clause, this issue was by no means easy.135 In dealing with it
in a later case, Chief Justice Taft tried to compromise in a way that had
evident instability. He wrote:
The mere reduction in the supply of an article to be
shipped in interstate commerce by the illegal or tortious
prevention of its manufacture or production is ordinarily
an indirect and remote obstruction to that commerce. But
when the intent of those unlawfully preventing the
manufacture or production is shown to be to restrain or
control the supply entering and moving in interstate
commerce, or the price of it in interstate markets, their
action is a direct violation of the Anti-Trust Act. 13 6
The first half of this proposition undeniably represented the legal
understanding in the United States prior to the key decisions in NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. in 1937137 and Wickard v. Filburn in 1942.138
130 Id. at 478-79 (majority opinion).
13' 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
1321 Id. at 398.
133 Compare id. at 381-82, with Duplex Printing, 254 U.S. at 480 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (defendants contending that their interference was justified under the common
law of New York, by the Clayton Act, and in self-defense).
134 See Coronado Coal, 259 U.S. at 396.
1" See id. at 407-09.
136 Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 310 (1925).
' 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
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However, the distinction turned on the question of authorization at the
national level, which had to raise difficult questions of fact across the
board. On this point, the Supreme Court beat a hasty retreat after the 1937
constitutional revolution made it clear that the Sherman Act applied to
local acts of violence that disrupted shipments of goods into interstate
commerce. However, the unmistakable message in Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader'39 was that acts of union violence, which resulted from a sit-in
strike that disrupted production for three months and prevented the
shipment of any goods into interstate commerce, were "of a different kind
and ha[ve] not been shown to have any actual or intended effect on price or
price competition."l4 0 Force, which is more dangerous than a collective
refusal to deal, was thus outside the antitrust laws after the Commerce
Clause was given far broader reach, even if it had been the raison d'etre of
federal action when the clause received a far narrower construction.14 '
This complex interplay between federalism and antitrust issues
explains the divergent treatment of the antitrust law as it applies to
commerce and to labor. The broad proposition contained in section 6 of
the Clayton Act led, after many twists and turns, to widespread acceptance
of the proposition that Congress could exempt labor from the antitrust law
on the original ground that commodities and people were different. 14 2 This
broad perception carried the day on the legislative front with the passage
of, for example, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, whose central provisions
outlawed the yellow dog contract and made it clear that federal courts
could not issue injunctions in ordinary inducement of breach of contract
cases in accordance with earlier common law principles.143
Ironically, even that last decision was subject to revision under the
Taft-Hartley Act, which adopted elaborate rules to limit the reach of
secondary boycotts.'" The section was passed in response to the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Hutcheson,145 which held that the
'
3 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942).
'" 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
140 Id. at 504.
141 Id. at 512-13.
142 See Kovner, supra note 124, at 757-61.
143 Norris-LaGuardia Act, Pub. L. No. 65, §§ 7-8, 47 Stat. 70, 71-72 (1932) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-115 (2006)).
'" Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 8(b)(4), 61
Stat. 136, 141-42 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006)) (imposing
restrictions without using the term "secondary boycott").
145 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
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public policy behind the Norris-LaGuardia Act not only prevented the
federal courts from issuing injunctions in labor dispute, but also insulated
unions from the criminal or civil enforcement of the antitrust laws.146 "It
would be strange indeed that although neither the Government nor
Anheuser-Busch (the private complainant) could have sought an injunction
against the acts here challenged, the elaborate efforts to permit such
conduct failed to prevent criminal liability punishable by imprisonment or
heavy fines." 4 7 But why? The two remedial responses work in quite
different ways. The injunction does not let the operation go, and thus
could easily squash legitimate activities, often at the behest of a private
party. Yet, once the defendant's acts are completed, this element of
uncertainty is removed from the case. In any subsequent proceedings,
moreover, the defendant has the full set of criminal law safeguards. 148
Indeed, writing in 1930 about an earlier draft version of what became the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, then-Professor Frankfurter and Mr. Nathan Greene
noted that a substantially similar piece of proposed legislation "explicitly
applies only to the authority of United States courts 'to issue any
restraining order or [ . . . ] injunction."' 1 4 9 The distinction here is not all
that different from the general rule that denies injunctions against the
publication of a libel while allowing damage actions at least under some
circumstances once it occurs.5 0
This complicated history shows that no one who wants to apply the
antitrust laws (or the secondary boycott provisions of Taft-Hartley) to
unions believes that people and commodities are the same thing, for their
differences are reflected by the profound differences between the provision
in labor and sales contracts, which are negotiated with a keen appreciation
of these differences.' 5 ' What is critical, however, is that the conventional
wisdom in favor of a broad reading of section 6 of the Clayton Act never
once came to grips with the central objection that any restriction on prices
and output leads to a diminution of social welfare by moving the market
'41 Id. at 234-35.
14 7 Id. at 235.
148 See id. at 235-36.
149 FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 128, at 220 (quoting Norris-LaGuardia Act § 1,
29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
Iso See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (allowing damages
at least in cases of actual malice); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (rejecting
prior restraints).
151 Kovner, supra note 124, at 757-61.
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further from a competitive equilibrium.15 2 That progressive blindness to
the evident dangers of collective behavior made it easier for the defenders
of the New Deal to give explicit protection to the entire process of
collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.
IV. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935
The huge expansion of union prerogatives ushered in before 1935 did
not give unions all that they wanted in industrial relations. Most critically,
even after passage of Norris-LaGuardia, employers were generally still
entitled to refuse to deal with unions and could still fire workers for their
involvement with union activities.'5 3  These defenses were still quite
strong, and they were the explicit target of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) of 1935, which was upheld by the Supreme Court shortly
thereafter against challenges that it involved a regulation of local
manufacturing which was outside the scope of the federal power under the
Commerce Clause. 154  The earlier objection that collective bargaining
counted as infringement of freedom of contract, as urged in Adair v. United
States155 and Coppage v. Kansas,'5 6 had already disappeared without a
trace in the litigation over the Railway Labor Act of 1926. 15 Chief Justice
Hughes held then that the refusal to deal with the union should be treated
as an interference with the right of workers to choose their own
representatives. 15 The point presupposes that once the union members
152 Kovner, supra note 124, at 76 1.
153 See Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-115 (2006)).
154 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937).
"55208 U.S. 161, 162 (1908).156 236 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1915).
157 Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188
(2006)).
1ss See Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570-
71 (1930). Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
Thus the prohibition by Congress of interference with the selection of
representatives for the purpose of negotiation and conference between
employers and employees, instead of being an invasion of the
constitutional right of either, was based on the recognition of the rights
of both. The petitioners invoke the principle declared in Adair ... and
Coppage ... but these decisions are inapplicable. The Railway Labor
Act of 1926 does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of
the carrier to select its employees or to discharge them. The statute is
(continued)
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make their choice, it binds outsiders to deal with them, when the principle
of freedom of association stands for the exact opposite proposition,
namely, that all persons can decide whether to deal with others at their own
choosing." 9 For these purposes, however, in this Article I do not revisit
the constitutional issue, but examine the long-term impact that the
operation of the NLRA has on the operation of labor markets, where all its
effects are negative. The simple explanation is that any conscious
deviation from the principles of competitive markets will always result in
social losses. The longer story requires a closer look at the key moves
made by the defenders of the NLRA, many of which remain all too
common today.
The difficulty with the NLRA begins with the rationales used to secure
its passage. The preamble to the statute laments that workers "do not
possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract." 6 0 "Full"
and "actual" are useless epithets, for neither explains why workers do not
have the same set of formal rights available to all others in terms of their
ability to accept or reject any offer that they choose. Of course, they may
be worse off if they cannot exert monopoly power, but by that logic
employers are also denied full and actual freedom of contract because they
too are not allowed to collude. Ironically, the Roosevelt administration
believed that some small businesses at least did have the right to collude,
which is why it went to such great length to pass codes of "fair
competition," all of which were intended to block open entry into what
could have been competitive markets. 16 1
not aimed at this right of the employers but at the interference with the
right of employees to have representatives of their own choosing. As
the carriers subject to the Act have no constitutional right to interfere
with the freedom of the employees in making their selections, they
cannot complain of the statute on constitutional grounds.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
159 It was just this point that started my interest in labor law as a student. See Richard
A. Epstein, Note, Individual Control over Personal Grievances Under Vaca v. Sipes, 77
YALE L.J. 559, 563-64 (1968) (critiquing the apologia for collective bargaining offered by
then-Harvard law professor Archibald Cox).
160 National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).




The NLRA goes on to say that the want of unions "aggravate[s]
recurrent business depressions," when in fact the opposite is true. 16 2
Wages in competitive markets tend to move smoothly.163  Strikes and
lockouts create strong discontinuities and greater business uncertainty,
which can only aggravate the social dislocations not only on the immediate
parties to the dispute, but on everyone else as well.16 4 The statute also
praises the act for increasing "the purchasing power of wage earners,"
which it does for union members, but for no one else.16 5 Indeed, strong
unions with monopoly power could reduce the wage prospects for
nonunion workers of the same employer. 166 The increase in the purchasing
power of some workers is offset by the decline in the purchasing power of
others and of the capital available at the firm level for either dividends or
reinvestment. The correct analysis on purchasing power requires a
global examination, which cannot extol the pluses of wealth transfer while
ignoring the minuses. Last, the "stabilization of competitive wage rates
and working conditions within and between industries"' 68 contains the
usual internal contradiction: stabilization is a polite word for
monopolization that seeks to keep workers' wages constant regardless of
changes in external conditions, and thus exacerbates instability by placing
a larger fraction of system-wide uncertainty on outside parties. The
defenders of the NLRA see social welfare tied to union success.16 9 They
are half right. The two are connected, and that connection is negative.
The basic structure of modern labor law brings each of these
difficulties to light. The basic structure of the NLRA first gives employees
the right to bargaining collectively in section 7, the key portion of which
provides:
162 National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151.
EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 123.
164 See id. at 123-24.
165 National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151.
166 See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 142-43.
167 Id at 142.
168 National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151.
169 Strengthening America's Middle Class Through the Employee Free Choice Act:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Emp't, Labor and Pensions of the H. Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 110th Cong. 72 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Harley
Shaiken, Professor, University of Califomia-Berkley) ("As union membership slides,
however, both unions' ability to raise wages for their members and spin-off benefits for
nonunion workers erode, wiping out the middle class dreams of many Americans.").
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Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such
170
activities ....
Note that the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 added the last clause
of the quoted material.17' With or without that clause, section 9(a) confers
a clear monopoly when it provides that:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a
unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of
172
employment ....
The term "exclusive" is what creates the legal monopoly for the union
that gains recognition.17 3 Section 9(a) thus contemplates what turns out to
be a difficult and complex set of elections to see whether any union, and if
so, which, shall be entitled to represent these workers.174  Once that
election is made, all dissenting workers are subject to agreements
negotiated by representatives, which override prospectively all individual
contracts entered into before the union gained recognition.175 The effect of
this provision is to create a durable legal monopoly that cannot be eroded
by time. This extra power is then backed up by a set of unfair labor
practices whose definition is broad enough to match the set of bargaining
rights contained in the Act. The first of these provisions states that "[i]t
170 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947 § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157
(2006) (amending National Labor Relations Act § 7).
17' Compare id., with National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 449, 452
(1935).
172 National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2006).
1 Id. See also J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944) (explaining how even
individual employees must adhere to exclusive bargaining rights of the certified union
representative).
174 National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
1 See JI. Case Co., 321 U.S. at 337-38.
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shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . .. to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 7.""' The provision necessarily uses broad definitions of
interference, restraint, and coercion, reminiscent of those adopted by Chief
Justice Hughes in Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co.17 7 insofar as it is set
against the backdrop of a duty to bargain in good faith with the union
under section 7 of the Act. To backstop this provision, section 8(a)(3)
makes it an unlawful practice "[flor an employer. . . [b]y discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization .... It is no longer possible to fire workers whose first
loyalty is with the union.179 It becomes difficult thereafter to determine
whether any dismissal was for union activities or simple incompetence, or
some combination of the above. The last provision in this critical trio is
section 8(5), which makes it "an unfair labor practice for an
employer .. . [t]o refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of
his employees, subject to the provisions of [section 9(a)]" which specifies
the rules for union elections. 8 0
In addition to the provisions that aid outside unions, the NLRA
contains provisions intended to prevent employers from taking defensive
measures by installing a union more to their liking.'8 ' It is to cut off this
prospect that section 8(3) provides that the employer cannot "encourage"
membership in a union. 82 That apparent oddity is designed to make sure
that employers cannot steer workers to unions with whom they would
prefer to deal.183 That provision in turn is complemented by section 8(2),
which makes it "an unfair labor practice ... [t]o dominate or interfere with
the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute
financial or other support to it."' 8 4 In effect, this prohibition on "company
unions" is designed to make sure that the employer does not construct its
176 National Labor Relations Act § 8(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
P7 Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 567-68
(1930).
178 National Labor Relations Act § 8(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
179 id.
8 0 Id. § 8(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
181 Id. § 8(l)43), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)-(3).
182 Id. § 8(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
183 See Richard A. Epstein, Senseless in Seattle, DEFINING IDEAS (Apr. 26, 2011),
http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/76501.
184 National Labor Relations Act § 8(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2).
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own union to block off employee participation in a trade union whose
interests are adverse to the firm.' 8 ' That prohibition can cost employees
dearly because it makes it more difficult for employers to smooth over
relations with workers before any union arrives on the scene. The enforced
separation has the additional adverse effect of making it harder to share
information with, and extend additional responsibilities to, employers-all
of which are opportunities that could make it more difficult for unions to
gain footholds. 86
The combined effect of these provisions denies the employer the right
just to say no to a union, which completely alters the bargaining in
question from what it is in a competitive industry. At this point, the
content of the duty to bargain in good faith becomes difficult to specify, as
it is not easy to walk the fine line between forcing parties to make
substantive concessions and allowing them to go their own way. The great
advantage of the competitive market is that when the two sides cannot
agree, they walk away and choose a trading partner with whom they prefer
to deal. That cannot be done here, so the negotiations can be both
protracted and divisive, where breakdowns can lead to strikes and lockouts,
with obvious adverse effects on innocent third parties.'8 7 No longer is the
objective to maximize the gains from transactions net of their costs;'88
instead, it is to increase transaction costs in ways that necessarily reduce
gains from trade. 89
No short article can hope to do justice to the immense amount of
complex litigation that arises out of the operation of these provisions. For
our purposes, the bottom line becomes clear without such a demonstration.
The statute in effect uses exclusive right of representation to cut off the
employer from all other sources of labor. The costs, both public and
1 Bruce E. Kaufman, The Case for the Company Union, 41 LABOR HISTORY 321, 321
(2000).
186 Gerald L. Pauling II & M. Andrew McGuire, The Implications of Crown Cork &
Seal Co. for Employee Involvement Committees as Labor Organizations Under the NLRA:
What Constitutes "Dealing with" Pursuant to Section 2(5) of the Act Since Electromation,
Inc.?, 18 LABOR LAW. 215, 226 (2002).
187 Josh L. Eidelson, The Employer Strikes Back, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 2, 2012),
http://prospect.org/article/employer-strikes-back.
188 Barry T. Hirsch & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The NLRA After Seventy Years: What Next?
4 (Jan. 7, 2006) (unpublished paper prepared for LERA/AEA session at Allied Soc. Sci.





private, are far greater than those in competitive markets where there are
continuous adjustments in wages and other terms of ongoing contracts and
high rates of turnover as new firms enter and prosper in markets.1 90 The
central social question is whether the high administrative costs, borne only
in small part by federal appropriations and needed to keep this monopoly
structure afloat, are justified by any ostensible social benefits. In this case,
the answer is clearly in the negative because the monopoly institutions put
in place by the Act are less efficient than the far simpler mechanisms that
they displace.
That simple fact goes a long way to explain the decline of unions in the
private sector. In 1935, the structure of American industry was far more
corporatist than it is today.1 91 So long as businesses are protected by tariff
walls and exclusive franchises, unions can target firms with monopoly
profits.1 92 However, once trade barriers relax in both domestic and foreign
markets, it is far harder for unions to extract monopoly rents from firms
that face stiff competition.193 That information is not lost on current or
prospective union workers who can see the decline of major union firms in
such key industries as automobiles and steel, whose ranks have been
decimated in past years. 194 The moment of truth comes when membership
in a union-which has its own costs in both time and money--costs an
employee more than the union can provide the employee in the new open
environment.' 95 As a result, union membership in the private sector started
its inexorable slide from about 35% of the private workforce in 1954196 to
190 Richard A. Epstein, How to Stymie the Teachers Unions, EDUC. NEXT (Oct. 1, 2012),
http://educationnext.org/how-to-stymie-the-teachers-unions/.
191 Erin Johansson & Julia Martinez Ortega, The Employee Free Choice Act: Ensuring
the Economy Works for Everyone, AM. RIGHTS WORK (Dec. 2008),
http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/araw-efca-ensuring
the-economyworks for _everyone-again.pdf
192 D.T. Armentano, The Failure ofAntitrust Policy, 44 FREEMAN 294, 296 (1994).
193 Daniel Griswold, Unions, Protectionism, and U.S. Competitiveness, 30 CATO J. 181,
190 (2010).
'
9 4 Id. at 193-94.
195 See Barry T. Hirsch, Unionization and Economic Performance: Evidence on
Productivity, Profits, Investment, and Growth, FRASER INST. (1997), http://www2.gsu.edul
-ecobth/FraserUnionPerformance.pdf.
"' William T. Dickens & Jonathan S. Leonard, Accounting for the Decline in Union
Membership, 1950-1980, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 323, 323 (1985).
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less than 7% today.'97  No raft of well-crafted union organization
campaigns could return unions to their glory days, even if the passage of
the Employee Free Choice Act might have stemmed the rate of decline, or
even reversed it by a few percentage points.
The point here is that this decline in labor union participation is an
unalloyed good, which contributes to the overall health of the American
labor markets. It does not, however, protect those markets from the next
wave of regulation that includes the New Deal standby of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938,9 whose coverage has been constantly extended
over time, and the employment discrimination laws first adopted in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. All of these measures are widely hailed as a
form of labor protection, but their logic proves otherwise. Labor markets
work well when the costs of transaction are low enough to permit gains
from trade. 99 The full range of labor statutes increases those transaction
costs and thus helps contribute to the recent high levels of unemployment
that have so hurt the economy in the recent slowdown.
V. LOOKING AHEAD
The status and power of unions have changed a great deal in the last
thirty years, but the key question now is whether the low level of union
concentration in the private sector renders unions irrelevant going forward.
Unfortunately, the answer to that question is no. What is clear is that it is
exceedingly difficult for unions to gain any advantage at the bargaining
table today.200 In most cases, the strike threat is no longer credible because
firms can use a variety of substitutes to ease the burden. 20 ' The recent
failures of the Communications Workers of America (CWA) to sustain its
strike at Verizon Communications Inc. illustrate the basic pattern.202 The
CWA went on strike in the landlines division, a profiting-losing center, to
197 Patrice Hill, Declining Number of Union Members Affects All Workers' Salaries,
WASH. TIMES (Jun. 7, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jun/7/declining-
number-of-union-members-affects-all-work/?page=all.
198 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006)).
199 Richard A. Epstein, The Road to Economic Perdition, DEFINING IDEAS (Sept. 7,
2011), http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/91801.
200 Griswold, supra note 193, at 183.
201 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Some Economics ofLabor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 988,
997-98 (1984).
202 See Steven Greenhouse, Verizon Workers Plan to End Strike, Agreeing to Revive
Talks Toward a Contract, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, at A14.
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get a fraction of the profits from the more substantial wireless division.203
Its political arm announced that Verizon refused to bargain seriously, and
that Verizon could afford to pay higher wages given the company's net
profits of $6 billion from revenues of $108 billion and its receipt of part of
a $10 billion dividend from its mobile unit.2 04 But, the CWA lacked a
credible threat for asking for a diversion of profits from a division that it
did not represent. The strike added to the CWA's cost when it became
clear that Verizon could maintain its wire line services without the CWA
employees in the short run, and could thereafter start to hire permanent
205
replacements. At the outset of the strike, I predicted that it would be a
fiasco for the CWA,206 and three days later, it was over.207
The strike route, then, does not work. Yet, unions still have resort to
political devices that help achieve their need for protected labor
monopolies. 20 8 They can, and do, bring antidumping actions to forestall
foreign competition. 2 09 They can, and do, participate in zoning decisions to
prevent the construction of new projects without the use of union labor.2 10
Their level of political support remains strong, but for reasons that depart
from the institutions of collective bargaining.2 11 Prominent union
supporters have insisted that unions should be regarded as a bulwark of the
"middle class," and that the struggles of the middle class are best explained
203 See generally Steven Greenhouse, Customers Feel Some Ripples from the Verizon
Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2011, at B4.
204 45,000 Workers on Strike at Verizon, COMM. WORKERS AMERICA (Aug. 7, 2011),
http://www.cwa-union.org/news/entry/45000_workersonstrike-at-verizon#.T-SYYG
jwnJA.
205 See Richard Epstein, Collective Bargaining = Collective Suicide, DEFINING IDEAS
(Aug. 16, 2011), http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/89366.
206 See, e.g., id.
207 Juan Gonzalez, Decision to End Verizon Strike Baffled Many Members, Supporters,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 24, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-08-24/
news/29939658_1_cwa-15-day-strike-striking-unions.
208 See EPSTEIN, supra note 55, at 209.
209 See Richard W. McGee, The Case to Repeal the Antidumping Laws, 13 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 491, 497-98 (1993).
210 See, e.g., Nancy Cleeland & Abigail Goldman, Grocery Unions Battle to Stop
Invasion of the Giant Stores, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2003, at Al (noting that unions are
persuading local officials to adopt zoning laws that keep out Wal-Mart stores).
211 See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 55, at 25-26 (noting the ability to persuade neutral
decision makers).
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by the reduction in the percentage of unionized workforce.2 12  The
argument is subject to the same basic objections that apply to the NLRA.
The middle class does not consist solely, or even largely, of union
members.2 13 With private union membership so low, the middle class
contains all sorts of small business owners and nonunion employees whose
own positions are made less secure by strong unions.214 The key question
is how to get their activities going, which requires a system of deregulation
of labor markets, not the return to union status. The one lesson from the
rise of public unions is that their gains are not sustainable. Through a
widespread movement in the 1960s, unions enjoyed the power to bargain
collectively in most states. 2 15 New York's Taylor Law is one such law; it
requires unions to forsake strikes in favor of arbitration.2 16 Under that law,
New York now finds that 75% of its public workers are unionized. 2 17 The
combination of pensions and health care benefits has put the state into an
unsustainable fiscal position.218 However, as with all unions, renegotiation
of existing contracts is a time-consuming and perilous project in which
most of the concessions are to be borne by future union members, and thus
do little if anything to ease the current crisis.219 The issue is of no small
importance because the number of public sector workers now exceeds the
number of private sector workers. 22 0 Their ranks have been thinned in
212 See Hearing, supra note 169, at 63 (statement of Nancy Schiffer, Assoc. Gen.
Counsel, AFL-CIO).
213 Hill, supra note 197.
214 Hearing, supra note 169, at 70 (statement of Prof. Harley Shaiken).
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Wisconsin, where the restriction on collective rights and the removal of
dues protection has cut membership in the American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, the state's second largest public-sector
union, from 62,818 to 28,745 during the period of March 2011 to February
~2212012.
At this juncture, there is both a positive and a normative question. The
former is whether the decline in unions will continue apace. There is no
doubt that without major legislative intervention it will. Quite simply,
under current conditions, union membership is at most a modest advantage
to most union members in most businesses. The hard core will be difficult
to remove because many of their members do see this advantage, which
they will try to preserve. However, industries that are not now unionized
will be able to resist the pressures at some private cost. The public sector
is likely to prove more volatile, given the experience in Wisconsin, but we
are just a few major budget crises from a long overdue overhaul of those
practices.
The normative question is, I think, easier. The title of this Article asks
the question of whether unions are saviors or scourges. At one time,
unions offered attractive benefits to their members, but always at the cost
of overall social welfare. At that point, they could be thought saviors to
some and scourges to others. On balance, however, their economic
activities have always been a significant negative for social welfare. The
truly amazing feature of American labor history is the fact that politicians
and judges were prepared to turn cartwheels to give unions special powers
that only increased the total level of social dislocations. On this level, at
least, the overall judgment should be clear. The union movement,
defended with such passion for its lofty ideals, is better understood as a
scourge, not a savior, not by some narrow theory that exalts management
over labor, but by any systematic evaluation of the overall negative impact
that unions have had on the social welfare of a great nation.
221 Belkin & Maher, supra note 3, at Al.
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